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he process of collective decision- 
making is a crucial part of every 
democratic system. Whether in 
the case of voting for a candidate in a par-
liamentary election or when conducting a 
referendum, individual choices made by 
numerous citizens have to be aggregated 
into a single collective decision. However, 
generating group decisions on the basis of 
various individual preferences is not that 
easy. In a democracy, where every citizen 
has the right to express his or her prefer-
ences, the complex decision-making pro-
cess requires clearly defined rules and has 
to lay out all available choices on the table. 
Nonetheless, different rules have different 
ways of accumulating preferences which, 
in turn, lead to varying outcomes. Social 
choice theory, commonly defined as the 
study of how to aggregate individual orders 
of preference, identifies and analyses these 
diverse rules of collective decision-making 
by applying logic and mathematics and 
retracing the core of the underlying con-
cepts.
The Handbook of Social Choice and Vot-
ing by Jac C. Heckelman and Nicholas R. 
Miller addresses, as its title suggests, the 
wide field of social choice and attempts to 
provide an extensive overview of the sub-
ject. The title deliberately includes the ad-
ditional aspect of “voting” to signal that it 
does not only cover the research in social 
choice theory in a narrow sense, but also 
expands it to broader questions of appli-
cation. Since its early beginnings, this field 
of study has proven to be a particularly 
complex subfield of social science. Con-
dorcet, Borda, Arrow and Sen – to name 
but a few – have occupied themselves with 
its numerous “paradoxes” and have had a 
major impact on today’s electoral studies. 
The Handbook seeks to break down the 
complex theories and ground-breaking 
logical derivations in an attempt to make 
this field of science accessible to an aca-
demic but non-specialist audience. While 
other volumes with similar titles exhibit 
a rather formalistic and theorem-proving 
approach and focus on studies of pub-
lic choice, this Handbook tries to cover 
a wider and more easily approachable set 
of issues in the field of social choice. It 
is composed of contributions from more 
than 20 different authors and subdivided 
into five major parts, beginning with the 
historic origins of social theory and con-
cluding with empirical findings on current 
political voting paradoxes. 
The first part, “Perspectives on Social 
Choice”, starts out historically with the 
early research in the field of social choice 
theory, dating back to the ancient Greeks. 
Ian McLean analyses the evolution of the 
approach and the puzzle of its steady dis-
appearance and reappearance in the course 
of time (15). Subsequently, Randall Hol-
combe elaborates the connection between 
unanimous consent and what has come to 
be known as “constitutional economics” 
by critically analysing Buchanan’s pioneer-
ing approach to this field of study (35). 
“Constitutional economics” is commonly 
defined as the study of effective economic 
decisions within the binding framework of 
constitutional law. Holcombe’s normative-
ly guided examination seeks to establish a 
framework that can be used for evaluating 
constitutional rules and designing desira-
ble laws to further individual and collec-
tive goals. The following essay, “Rational 
choice and the calculus of voting” by An-
dré Blais, shifts the focus to the rational 
choice aspects of social choice theory (54). 
Downs’s well-known rational choice ap-
proach had major theoretical impacts on 
later research concerning participation in 
democratic mass elections. Blais critically 
reviews Downs’s so-called “paradox of vot-
ing” and its continuously added amend-
ments to explain the astonishing puzzle of 
why people take part in elections. Part one 
ends with a contribution by Robi Ragan 
scrutinising computational tools which 
analyse, apply, or extend traditional social 
choice models (67). This ground-breaking 
new technology enables the understanding 
of fundamental social choice problems the 
complexity of which could not be untan-
gled with previous traditional tools. 
After having established the outlines of so-
cial theory in the first part, the second part 
of the Handbook concentrates on practi-
cal implementations concerning pairwise 
voting choices. Majority rule is among 
the simplest methods for generating a de-
cision and paradigmatic for social choice 
theory. Its easiest form is when having to 
decide between two alternatives whereby 
one alternative must receive the majority 
of votes. However, more often than not, 
there are more than two alternatives avail-
able, thus impeding the decision-mak-
ing process. Scott Moser considers those 
more complex voting situations and fo-
cuses mainly on the Condorcet principle 
and May’s Theorem (83). In particular, 
he evaluates the mathematical structure 
and varying outcomes of so-called “tour-
naments” which apply when majority ties 
do not occur. Keith L. Dougherty further 
specifies this concept of majority rule and 
discusses a variation of different majority 
options. Overall, he elaborates on the im-
portance of supermajority rules in social 
decision-making. Proceeding with the key 
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aspect of vote aggregation, Dan S. Felen-
thal and Moshé Machover measure “a pri-
ori voting power” in the following chapter 
(117). This concept evolves around the 
expectation that voting power may not be 
distributed equally, let alone proportion-
ally, to the final voting outcome. Often, 
one vote does not carry the same weight as 
another (e.g. the vote of one shareholder 
who owns more than 50% of a company). 
Therefore, the widely accepted principle 
of “one person one vote” does not always 
apply. Part two concludes with a contribu-
tion discussing the “Condorcet Jury The-
orem”. This theorem implies that a group 
which uses simple majority voting to gen-
erate a decision is more likely to make the 
correct choice than an individual all by 
him- or herself. This suggests that, as the 
saying goes, wisdom might indeed lie in 
the crowds. 
The third part revolves around various 
spatial models of social choice. Its essen-
tial idea is that a geometrical approach is 
able to reflect the “space” of various policy 
alternatives, different candidates, and all 
other political decisions within a one- or 
multi-dimensional model. Based on this 
understanding, voters’ preferences are 
aligned and traceable at a political contin-
uum, the ends of which represent alterna-
tives to a particular decision. Voters rec-
oncile their so-called “ideal points” with 
different political positions along this con-
tinuum and pick the alternatives closest to 
their own preferred outcome. The origin 
of the standard spatial model goes back to 
Duncan Black and was later advanced by 
Downs. Nicholas R. Miller picks up the 
most basic elements of this model in his 
essay “The spatial model of social choice 
and voting”. He distinguishes people lo-
cating themselves at the centre of the po-
litical continuum from the more extreme 
left- and right-wing political positions at 
both ends of the spectrum (163). Applying 
these basic approaches to an institutional 
level, Thomas H. Hammond discusses a 
newly developed unified spatial model of 
the American Congress. Essentially, this 
model provides guidance for understand-
ing fundamental problems involving pol-
icy stability and the responsiveness of the 
US system. It also elaborates the tendency 
towards gridlocks inflicted by the consti-
tution itself. However, in order to under-
stand real world parties’ policy behaviour, 
another spatial model was introduced. The 
so-called “electoral competition spatial 
model” – developed by Hotelling – orig-
inally analysed economic puzzles. How-
ever, Downs picked up its basic ideas and 
converted it for the purpose of political 
analysis. Today’s “Downsian spatial mod-
el” assumes that the motivations of politi-
cians are simply office-seeking incentives, 
whereas voters are purely policy-oriented. 
This approach is further extended by Peter 
J. Coughlin and critically investigated in 
his essay “Probabilistic voting in models 
of electoral competition” (218). His ex-
pansion of the Hotelling-Downs model 
displays astonishing results regarding Nash 
equilibriums and voting behaviour as fore-
casted by the original model. 
The Handbook having so far analysed pair-
wise social choice, part four continues with 
social choice from multiple alternatives. 
One of the most famous scholars to have 
dealt with various kinds of voting systems 
and the aggregation of individual prefer-
ences is Kenneth Arrow. His well-known 
“impossibility theorem” has uncovered 
the impracticality of all voting systems to 
simultaneously guarantee certain mini-
mal conditions of fairness and sensibility 
when choosing between three or more 
alternatives. Elizabeth Maggie Penn seeks 
to get hold of this phenomenon and anal-
yses other findings of scholars who have 
extended Arrow’s axioms. By concluding 
that one choice always seems to be deemed 
inferior to other possible options, Penn 
highlights the challenges and difficulties 
which – according to her – make a dem-
ocratic system significant (260). Following 
these findings, Jac C. Heckelman addresses 
the “properties and paradoxes of common 
voting rules”. He compares the most com-
monly studied voting rules in which only 
one single winner is picked out of several 
options. Nicolaus Tideman, in his contri-
bution, modifies this approach by dealing 
with voting rules that can be used for se-
lecting multiple winners. To this end, he 
establishes five key categories for evaluat-
ing different voting systems. One of his 
crucial arguments is that the representa-
tion of a diverse population must be guar-
anteed by all voting systems. However, he 
concludes that a trade-off between greater 
representativeness and the convenience of 
the voting system will always prevail. 
In order to combine social choice theory 
with empirical analysis, different meas-
ures must be applied for linking empirical 
findings to constructed concepts of social 
choice. The spatial model – described and 
analysed in part three – has already giv-
en an insight into how geometrical ap-
proaches may simplify voting predictions 
and outcomes. Following up on this idea, 
Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole try 
to get hold of ideological positions in the 
US Congress. To this end, they evaluate 
roll call voting data from US Congressmen 
and depict those decisions on a left-right 
continuum. Based on this approach, Hare 
and Pool employ the so-called “random 
utility model” which entails specific scal-
ing procedures (333). This model tries to 
get hold of the utility one legislator gains 
from each of his or her roll call choic-
es, implying that he or she will vote for 
whichever alternative is closest to his or 
her ideal point. The following chapter, 
“The uncovered set and its applications”, 
consists of many contributions specifying 
the so-called “uncovered set” (UCS) – a so-
cial choice set of alternatives which are not 
covered by any other alternatives (396). 
The authors use a newly developed “grid 
search algorithm” estimating uncovered 
sets in diverse environments under major-
ity rule. Their findings show that policy 
choices are always constrained by other 
alternatives from the uncovered set. The fi-
nal essay, by Marek M. Kaminski, discuss-
es empirical examples of voting paradoxes 
that had serious political consequences in 
real life. One famous example is the US 
presidential election in 2000 in which 
George W. Bush defeated Al Gore, despite 
coming in second on the popular vote. 
All in all, this Handbook can be described 
as well-written and fairly balanced. How-
ever, it is debatable whether it fulfils its 
general purpose as a Handbook of social 
choice and voting behaviour. By a uni-
versal definition, a Handbook should be 
a general compendium of information in 
a certain field of research which is com-
prehensively designed and provides quick 
answers for its covered subject. Heckelman 
and Miller pointed out that this was their 
reasoning as well: compiling a perspicu-
ous composition of the wide field of social 
choice in order to break down the complex 
concepts for an academic but non-special-
ist audience. Evaluating this attempt, the 
selection of each chapter is logical and also 
the organisation of the chapters is coher-
ent. Still, the essays themselves are quite 
technical and especially parts two and 
three (“Pairwise Social Choice” and “Spa-
tial Models of Social Choice”) may not be 
understandable for readers unfamiliar with 
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the subject. Complex spatial models and 
intricate formulas may lead to confusion 
and a lack of understanding on the part 
of the audience which the editors wish to 
reach. Considering that Heckelman and 
Miller sought to compose an approach-
able Handbook which is distinct in this 
regard from other more expert books such 
as The Elgar Companion to Public Choice by 
Shugart and Razzolini, it is question able 
whether they reached their goal. It may 
even be concluded that this Handbook is 
partially redundant, given other previous-
ly written books covering this field of re-
search. Nevertheless, this Handbook seeks 
to assort a collection of all relevant social 
choice aspects and provides a good to very 
good insight of this field of science. Espe-
cially the detailed glossary and index are 
useful for a quick orientation. 
Another point of criticism is the fact that 
many of the models analysed only apply 
to presidential systems using majority 
rule, such as that of the United States. A 
parliamentary system with proportion-
al representation is often not included in 
the practical analysis and does not receive 
enough consideration. On the contrary, 
empirical findings refer most often to the 
US Congress (e.g. Chapter 18 “Measuring 
ideology in Congress”). The process of co-
alition formation and social choice theo-
ry on proportional voting systems is not 
covered at all, leaving several questions un-
answered. How are coalitions formed and 
how does this affect the voting behaviour 
of citizens? 
A greater use of “real life” examples – found 
in chapter five – would have increased the 
clarity of the Handbook especially for a 
non-specialist audience. Moreover, con-
sidering that the field of social choice is 
constantly evolving, it might have been 
desirable to include a look at the future 
prospects of the field. 
Nonetheless, the Handbook by Heckel-
man and Miller provides a comprehen-
sive and up-to-date overview of the vast 
and seemingly impenetrable field of social 
choice and voting. Written in a reasonably 
understandable technical style, the authors 
succeed in making complex issues rela-
tively accessible to a non-expert audience. 
Therefore, the Handbook of Social Choice 
and Voting is a great addition to every 
bookshelf and recommended to all schol-
ars who are interested in this field of study.
Heckelman, Jac C. / Miller, Nicholas R. 
(eds.) (2015): Handbook of Social Choice 
and Voting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
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Price: £140.
he future of subsequent gener-
ations is the subject of growing 
social concern as well as becom-
ing a pressing question for economists and 
philosophers in the context of large-scale 
political, social and environmental up-
heaval (economic crises, pension schemes, 
environmental disasters...).
The purpose of Intergenerational Justice 
is to address this issue by providing a 
framework for philosophical reflection 
through sixteen articles by internationally 
recognised philosophers. It questions the 
content and the relevance of a theory for 
future generations. Do present generations 
have responsibilities or even obligations 
towards future individuals? Is it possible 
for generations to cooperate, even though 
they will never meet? 
The book is intended primarily for readers 
well versed in the subject, witness its some-
times technical language and demonstra-
tions. Clearly structured, it is divided into 
a theoretical part (“theory”) and an analy-
sis of specific cases (“specific cases”). How-
ever, the present review will not follow this 
configuration, for both epistemological 
(theory never goes without practice, syn-
thesis without analysis) and organizational 
considerations (the articles’ content do not 
legitimise such a distinction). A thematic 
analysis will be privileged in order to syn-
thesise the various contributions.
Intergenerational Justice exposes the theories 
commonly used to analyse the problem of 
future generations: Communitarianism 
(J. Thompson), Libertarianism (H. Stein-
er, P. Vallentyne), Contractualism (S.M. 
Gardiner, D. Heyd, D. Attas, R. Kumar), 
Marxism (C. Bertram), Reciprocity (A. 
Gosseries), Sufficientarianism (L.H. Mey-
er, D. Roser, C. Wolf ), Egalitarianism (G. 
Arrhenius) and Constitutionalism (V. M. 
Muniz-Fraticelli).
Obligations regarding future generations 
create a clear partition between the differ-
ent theories. Do present generations have 
a duty towards non-contemporaries? For 
Thompson, the notion of obligation is 
both necessary and desirable: the “life-
time-transcending interests” concept (the 
existence of interests that remain after 
the death of the individual) allows the 
existence of a chain of intergenerational 
bonds. Our future demands will depend 
on future individuals. This expectation 
towards future generations justifies a duty 
of respect for all non-existent individuals 
– be it of the dead or of future individ-
uals – and the development of a “trans-
generational policy”. Unfortunately, the 
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